IFP SECURITY CLUSTER

RESPONDING TO PEOPLE'S SECURITY NEEDS

Improving the impact of EU programming

Synthesis report

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The Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. IfP draws together the complementary geographic and thematic expertise of 10 civil society organisations (and their networks) with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. Its aim is to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong independent analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy decisions.

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The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. ICTJ works in societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved. To learn more, visit http://www.ictj.org.

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Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organisation that works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others. To learn more, visit http://www.saferworld.org.uk/.

RESPONDING TO PEOPLE'S SECURITY NEEDS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTT	Country and Thematic Teams
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
IfP	Initiative for Peacebuilding
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security sector reform
UNDP	UN Development Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is a synthesis of research findings and conclusions emerging from the Security Cluster of the European Commission (EC)-supported Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP). It is designed to help EU and Member State policy-makers improve the impact of their security-related programming by identifying the challenges that prevent policy from being implemented as intended and recommending alternative strategies. Based on detailed analysis and case study research, the paper summarises the main gaps identified in relation to EU and Member State security-building programmes and provides detailed recommendations on addressing these gaps.

The paper focuses most heavily on security sector reform (SSR) programmes in view of the prominence SSR now has in donor policy discourse and the ambitious objectives and broad scope of contemporary donor SSR policy. Issues such as human security, transitional justice and gender are also considered as cross-cutting themes. The catch-all term "security-building programmes/activities" is used to describe the different forms of programming, each of which is designed to enhance security for beneficiaries in target countries in different ways.

KEY FINDINGS AND CHALLENGES

SECURITY AND CONFLICT

The provision of security and justice is one of the main requirements for a peaceful, democratic society and sustained social and economic development. Socio-economic development is in turn a condition for sustainable security. At the EU level, a robust set of policy statements, frameworks, concepts, conclusions, communications and instruments now exist concerning security-related programming, including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), as well as SSR. There is increasing acceptance within the EU and Member States that security-building activities such as these need to be holistic in scope, people-centred, locally appropriate and owned.

However, the political and security realities in many conflict-affected contexts pose formidable challenges to those attempting to restore or build security and justice in a holistic, transparent and sustainable manner. The EU is taking steps to address these challenges, initially by recognising them in the *Council Conclusions on security and development*[1] and the *Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility*.[2] The process to develop action and implementation plans based on the detailed recommendations contained in the Council conclusions represents an excellent opportunity to address many of the challenges faced by practitioners attempting to translate the EU's policy commitments into practical action.

IMPLEMENTATION GAPS AND CHALLENGES

- **Weak analysis and information sharing.** IfP research identified a number of cases where security-building programmes lacked an evidential base, relied on weak analysis, or where available analysis and monitoring information was not appropriately shared among relevant stakeholders.

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1   Council of the EU (2007a). *Council Conclusions on security and development*. 2831st External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 19-20th November 2007. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf.
2   Council of the EU (2007b). *Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility*. 2831st External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 19-20th November 2007. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97177.pdf.

- **Failure to prioritise conflict prevention and peacebuilding**. Whether because of confusion over policies, different ends being pursued, or simply for lack of guidance on the matter,[3] IfP research found that donor security-building programming in conflict-affected societies tends not to be framed in terms of conflict prevention/peacebuilding. The lack of a strategic vision-based peacebuilding approach in many cases contributes to the difficulty in connecting SSR with conflict prevention.

- **Limited public participation.** EU and Member-State policy now recognises that "people-centred" approaches to security-building produce more relevant, effective and sustainable results. This principle is reflected in the EU's own security-building policy frameworks.[4] Yet too often donor engagement does not provide for meaningful input from wider society. Research suggests that where communities have been meaningfully involved, security-building and related development activities are seen as more relevant and legitimate by those they seek to benefit.

- **Weak local ownership.** Recognising the importance of national ownership has become a prerequisite for development cooperation in recent years. This can be particularly important in security-building because it often relates to the philosophy, methodology and machinery through which a state exercises its monopoly on the legitimate use of force over its citizens, and therefore touches on such complex and sensitive issues as national security, sovereignty and national political discourse. Yet IfP research has reinforced previous research findings to the effect that security-building programmes, especially SSR-support programmes, are generally deficient in this area.

- **Poor coordination, competing agendas.** Research shows numerous failures among security and development actors to coordinate their efforts. This is a significant problem in view of the diverse security problems that typically face conflict-affected countries and the complexity of government security systems. Failure to coordinate activities can result in the poor exchange of information and inadequate communication between donors, recipient governments and communities, missed opportunities to exploit the links and synergies between programmes, duplication of effort, inconsistency between donor approaches and confusion about roles and responsibilities.

- **Failure to mainstream important cross-cutting issues.**
  - *Gender*. Gender issues have gained broad recognition in areas such as human rights, development cooperation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in recent years. There has been a growing effort to support gender-sensitive SSR practices within the EU and among other donors, primarily through policy development and the elaboration of practical tools to guide and improve implementation. However, IfP research shows that gender-based needs are rarely assessed and addressed in a systematic way by programmes.
  - *Justice.* Tackling impunity and restoring the rule of law are crucial elements in reducing the likelihood of further outbreaks of violence, and in reducing abuse of the population by security agents. However, donor SSR programmes are more likely to target sub-sectors such as policing and the military than the justice sector.
  - *Justice-sensitive approaches to SSR.* Transitional justice is even less recognised within current security-building frameworks. Justice-sensitive approaches to SSR – the reform of abusive institutions, particularly within the security system – is an important part of a transitional justice approach and is particularly necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the longer term.

- **Limited attention to political and diplomatic dialogue.** In many conflict-affected environments, outside attempts to change or influence the security sector are perceived as intruding on national sovereignty. Security-building interventions, particularly SSR, can be highly sensitive in so far as they touch on issues of governance and human rights, and challenge entrenched power structures.

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3   For example, in the SSR field, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has provided the most detailed guidance to date on how to implement programmes. Conspicuously though, the guidance gives little coverage to questions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and is not at all tailored for use in fragile or conflict-affected environments. See: OECD-DAC (2007). *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting security and justice.* Paris, France. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

4   For example, all European actors have endorsed the OECD-DAC guidance on SSR which foregrounds this issue. See: OECD-DAC (2005a). *Security System Reform and governance* - DAC guidelines. Paris, France. Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_33800289_1_1_1_1,00.html; also OECD-DAC (2007). Op. cit.

IfP research shows that security-building efforts that succeed are typically grounded in effective national political processes (one element of which may be peace agreements), and generally backed up by robust diplomatic dialogue between donors and recipient states. Conversely, where security-building programmes fail, it is often because too much faith has been invested in technical/programmatic responses where the political conditions for progress at the operational level are absent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. European Council, European Commission and Member State security practitioners should plan and develop security-building activities on the basis of a shared and solid evidence base, including conflict analyses.

2. The Council, Commission and Member States should ensure that when carried out in conflict-affected or fragile states, security-building activities are explicitly targeted at conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

3. Council, Commission and Member State practitioners should adopt more participatory ways of delivering security-building programmes, in the first instance by adopting and promoting new tools for consulting communities on security issues and programme priorities.

4. The Council, Commission and Member States should enhance efforts to increase local ownership of security-building activities by supporting and encouraging the development of comprehensive national security/SSR strategies with broad ownership, together with capacity-building support for the administrative and operational structures necessary to deliver and oversee programmes and reforms.

5. Council, Commission and Member State security practitioners should act at the national and local levels to identify and respond to specific gender, justice and transitional justice issues, making better use of any existing tools and guidance on these issues and supplementing this with community-wide awareness-raising and training drives.

6. In order to ensure greater coherence and coordination between EU security-building strategies and activities, the Commission, Member States and successive EU Presidencies should prioritise the development and implementation of action plans for the Council Conclusions on security and development and situations of fragility which include guidance on the development of country strategies/visions as the basis for security-building efforts.

7. Council, Commission and Member States should, in addition to refining their approach to programmatic and operational questions, ensure that security-building programmes are supported by and linked to political dialogue with key national, regional and international decision-makers in each case.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is a synthesis of research findings and conclusions emerging from the Security Cluster of the EC-supported IfP. The cluster's purpose is to help EU and Member State policy-makers improve the impact of their security-related programming through research which identifies the problems that prevent policy being implemented as intended and recommends alternative strategies.

The IfP Security Cluster's research was carried out in two stages. Firstly, a Security Mapping Exercise[5] served to scope out EU and Member State policies and high-level trends related to donor security-related programming. Secondly, case study research was carried out which examined in detail the realities of policy implementation in seven countries that have experienced fragility or violent conflict: Afghanistan, Albania, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Ukraine.

Different types of donor programming were covered by the research, ranging from DDR, to SALW control and SSR. However, the research focussed most heavily on SSR programmes in view of the prominence SSR now has in donor policy discourse and the ambitious objectives and broad scope of contemporary donor SSR policy. Issues such as human security, transitional justice and gender were also considered in the research as cross-cutting themes. The catch-all term "security-building programmes/activities" is frequently used in this paper to describe these different forms of programming, each of which is designed to enhance security for beneficiaries in target countries in different ways.

This paper begins with a brief discussion of current thinking and policy around security-building programming, particularly in relation to development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Important aspects of donor policy are highlighted as are a number of known challenges. In following sections, the main gaps identified in relation to EU and Member State security-building programmes are summarised, with reference to case study research and other available evidence. A concluding section then provides detailed recommendations on addressing these gaps, including, for example, the need to focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding when attempting security-building work in conflict-affected states to clarify the overall purpose of this work and ensure that appropriate methods are adopted.

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5   S. Babaud and E. Kets (2008). *Security mapping exercise.* Security Cluster, Initiative for Peacebuilding. Available at http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/IfP_Security_mapping.pdf.

KEY FINDINGS AND CHALLENGES

SECURITY AND CONFLICT

The provision of security and justice is one of the main requirements for a peaceful, democratic society and sustained social and economic development. Socio-economic development is in turn a condition for sustainable security. Security provision and access to justice are essential public services which should be recognised as a basic entitlement. They are fundamental building blocks to achieving good governance and are critical for the creation of a secure environment within which human rights and the rule of law are respected.

However, particularly in post-conflict contexts, norms on the use of force often change for the worse, arms proliferate and are misused, while state justice and security agencies may become predatory, weak or threatened by rebel and criminal elements. As such, security and justice are important themes in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. These problems are commonly addressed through programmes that variously attempt to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, control the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and reform institutions such as the police, military and judiciary.[6]

At the EU level, a robust set of policy statements, frameworks, concepts, conclusions, communications and instruments now exists concerning security-related programming, including SALW control and DDR as well as SSR.[7] Activities under these policies can be undertaken bilaterally by Member States, under the Council's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, or under the European Commission's external action policy areas and related instruments.[8]

This represents good progress, with clear policy statements now covering core security-building activities and spurring increased convergence on the norms and standards that guide this work. For example, the EU Council and Commission have both endorsed the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) policy on SSR, which provides a coherent, comprehensive and clearly normative take on the issue.[9] As such, there is increasing acceptance within the EU and Member States that security-building activities like SSR need to be holistic in scope, people-centred, and locally appropriate and owned. In addition, they should be developed according to basic principles of good governance such as accountability and transparency.

However, the political and security realities in many conflict-affected contexts pose formidable challenges to those attempting to restore or build security and justice in a holistic, transparent and sustainable manner. A lack of political will, entrenched and elitist power structures, political manipulation of assistance efforts, impunity for human rights violations, poor governance and corruption, difficult and fluid operating environments, and a lack of appropriate human and financial resources are just some of the challenges faced by practitioners on a daily

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6   For example, see: http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1784.
7   Including but not limited to: Council of the EU (2005). *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*. Brussels, Belgium; Commission of the European Communities (2006). *A concept for European Community support for Security Sector Reform*. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium; Council of the EU (2006a). *Council Conclusions on a policy framework for Security Sector Reform*. 2736th General Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg; European Commission (2006). *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)*. Approved by the European Commission on 14th December 2006 and by the Council of the EU on 11th December 2006. Brussels, Belgium; Council of the EU (2006b). *EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition*. (Doc. No. 5319/06.) Brussels, Belgium.
8   These are: Development Cooperation, Enlargement and the Stabilisation and Association Process, Neighbourhood Policy, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, Democracy and Human Rights, External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
9   Council of the EU (2006a). Op. cit.; Commission of the European Communities (2006). Op. cit.

basis. In some contexts, the very breakdown of security and justice that security-building seeks to respond to can endanger programming or favour expediency over a long-term perspective. Further challenges are posed by the need to tailor interventions on a case-by-case basis using sophisticated analysis and planning tools, and to coordinate action across a number of institutions, agencies and Member States.

The EU is taking steps to address these challenges, initially by recognising them in the *Council Conclusions on security and development*[10] and the *Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility*.[11] The process to develop action and implementation plans based on the detailed recommendations contained in the Council Conclusions – including conducting case studies to analyse current practice and establishing ad hoc Country and Thematic Teams (CTT) to work towards more coherent and coordinated action at country level – represents an excellent opportunity to address many of the challenges faced by practitioners attempting to translate the EU's policy commitments into practical action.

IMPLEMENTATION GAPS

In light of the policy commitments and implementation challenges outlined above, the following section briefly summarises the IfP Security Cluster's findings on the degree to which policy commitments are currently being implemented in practice while also exploring blockages to proper implementation.

WEAK ANALYSIS AND INFORMATION SHARING
IfP research identified a number of cases where security-building programmes lacked an evidential base, relied on weak analysis, or where available analysis and monitoring information were not appropriately shared among relevant stakeholders. In view of the challenging nature of security-building programming, this is highly problematic because it means many programmes will not be based on a thorough understanding of the context they operate in, including relevant conflict dynamics; may lack a sound theory of change in relation to a clear programmatic baseline; and cannot be easily coordinated where relevant.

This problem is not a new one. It is recognised in both the Council Conclusions on security and development and on situations of fragility which call *inter alia*, for improved frameworks for joint analysis and exchange of information. This is clearly recognition at policy level of the value that joint assessments between international and national actors have for informing security-building strategies from a common evidence base.[12] However, IfP research suggests that in order to fulfil this aspiration within the EU, the understanding, use, scope and coherence of current assessment and diagnostic tools available to EU institutions and Member States need to be further developed.[13]

FAILURE TO PRIORITISE CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING
The analytical and information-sharing failures mentioned above link closely with a second problem identified in IfP research. Whether because of confusion over policies, different ends being pursued, or simply for lack of guidance on the matter,[14] IfP research finds that donor security-building programming in conflict-affected societies tends not to be framed in terms of conflict prevention/peacebuilding. The lack of a strategic vision-based peacebuilding approach in many cases contributes to the difficulty in connecting SSR with conflict prevention. For example, in Afghanistan, Albania, Burundi, DRC and Ukraine, donors and/or national/host governments have focussed narrowly on technical capacity-building for security institutions. In each case, this has failed to address

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10 Council of the EU (2007a). Op. cit.
11 Council of the EU (2007b). Op. cit.
12 In addition, the Commission recently issued a joint declaration with the World Bank and the UN Development Group committing to working in partnership with those institutions to assess post-crisis situations and plan recovery efforts. This appears to offer a useful vehicle for joint assessment and planning on security and conflict responses, at least from a donor perspective. See: EU, World Bank and UN Development Group (2008). *Joint declaration on post-crisis assessments and recovery planning*. Available at http://www.undg.org/docs/9419/trilateral-JD-on-post-crisis-assessments-final.pdf.
13 These include but are not limited to: joint fact-finding missions; needs assessments; the Community Governance profile; the European Commission checklist for root causes of conflict; ESDP planning/fact-finding missions; and Member State methodologies such as the UK Department for International Development's (DfID) Strategic Conflict Assessment.
14 For example, in the SSR field, the OECD-DAC has provided the most detailed guidance to date on how to implement programmes. Conspicuously though, the guidance gives little coverage to questions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and is not at all tailored for use in fragile or conflict-affected environments. See: OECD-DAC (2007). Op. cit.

the fundamental peacebuilding concern of how security institutions serve the needs of society through reform of their mission, behaviour, culture and relationship with the civilian population. It should be noted that in some cases, such as DRC, the national/host government has hampered efforts to take a peacebuilding approach to SSR in order to pursue a less holistic agenda.

In Nepal, many have viewed questions of public security from a state-building or foreign policy perspective. In the past, some donors provided technical support to the security forces, including arms and equipment, despite persistent human rights violations by the security forces. Post-conflict, those working from a state-building perspective have prioritised reintroducing the Nepal Police into former conflict areas to restore public order, and negotiating the integration of former Maoist fighters into a reformed Nepal Army. Peacebuilders have not been wholly unsupportive to these efforts, but have also drawn attention to the need to think through the manner in which all this is done, calling for better public consultation and gestures of reconciliation around the reintroduction of the police and looking for issues of both impunity and inclusion to be dealt with in relation to SSR.

A conflict prevention/peacebuilding approach to security-building would take an analysis of conflict drivers as its starting point and include objectives around addressing the identified problems. This analysis will suggest priority issues to be addressed (for example, gender, human rights and justice issues in the cases of Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC), as well as important issues of process which will affect *how* rather than *what* programmes are delivered. At best, the failure of donors and practitioners to adequately situate security-building activities in conflict-affected contexts within a peacebuilding framework is a missed opportunity. At worst, it may jeopardise steps towards peace and democracy by failing to address key drivers of tension and conflict or leaving programmes blind to their negative impact on conflict dynamics.

LIMITED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

As noted above, EU and Member-State policy now recognises that "people-centred" approaches to security-building produce more relevant, effective and sustainable results. This principle is reflected in the EU's own SSR policy frameworks; the EU DDR concept also underlines the importance of local ownership through consultative and participatory approaches.[15] Yet too often donor engagement does not provide for meaningful input from wider society.[16] IfP research in Burundi for example notes that donors have failed to involve wider society in the definition of its own security needs, focusing solely on the requirements of state institutions.

Participation and consultation in the design and delivery of security-building activities can be limited for many reasons, including scant human and economic resources, limited know-how, a lack of political will or security concerns. However, the failure to engage with citizens is likely to reduce the direct relevance of security-building programmes to affected communities, but may also undermine state-building objectives. In Afghanistan, with the exception of efforts to tackle gender-based violence (see below), the lack of integration of Afghan perspectives has led much of Afghan society including many civil servants to reject certain reforms.

Research suggests that where communities have been meaningfully involved, security-building and related development activities are seen as more relevant and legitimate by those they seek to benefit. In Haiti, for example, the mainstreaming of a conflict prevention rationale by the Commission in an urban planning and regeneration project has led to consultations with local people being built into programming. As a result, the project appears to have responded to people's needs on the ground and has good prospects for success. In Ukraine, an initial failure to solicit the participation of, or consultation with, local communities in the process of project design was later partly addressed by an imaginative public outreach campaign by the EU Border Assistance Mission. In the areas covered by the outreach, general awareness among the local population of the project and appreciation of its objectives was notably higher. At the same time, the initial assumption that attempts to curb cross-border smuggling would not be welcomed locally was shown to be misguided.

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15 See: footnote 4.

16 For an exception to this rule, see: Balkan Youth Union, Centre for Security Studies, CIVIL, Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld (2006). *Creating safer communities: Lessons from South Eastern Europe.* Available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/236/creating_safer_communities_lessons_from_south_eastern_europe.

WEAK LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Recognising the importance of national ownership has become a prerequisite for development cooperation in recent years. The *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005)[17] effectively set local ownership as an international standard. This can be particularly important in security-building because it often relates to the philosophy, methodology and machinery through which a state exercises its monopoly on the legitimate use of force over its citizens, and therefore touches on such complex and sensitive issues as national security, sovereignty and national political discourse.

Yet IfP research has reinforced previous research findings to the effect that security-building programmes, especially SSR-support programmes, are generally deficient in this area.[18] It would appear that only in a minority of cases do partner countries have significant input into programming. A good indicator for this (but rarely found in practice) is the existence of agreed national strategies for security, SSR and similar, to which donors and their partner governments have both provided input. Moreover, local ownership is too often restricted to narrow segments of partner governments to the exclusion of other parts of the state and civil society. Limiting the definition of local ownership to little more than partner government ownership can actually exacerbate the problem rather than improving it as programmes are less likely to be based on realities outside of the capital. It can also have a wider impact on the public perception of a donor if they are seen as "allied" to the government at the "expense" of the population. Local ownership which is inclusive of both community and state concerns also requires a genuine commitment on behalf of the partner government. In some countries, such as the DRC, the government's lack of commitment to SSR is a serious challenge and prevents more effective and strategic approaches to SSR.

POOR COORDINATION, COMPETING AGENDAS

Research shows numerous failures among security and development actors to coordinate their efforts. This is a significant problem in view of the diverse security problems that typically face conflict-affected countries and the complexity of government security systems. Failure to coordinate activities can result in the poor exchange of information and inadequate communication between donors, recipient governments and communities, missed opportunities to exploit the links and synergies between programmes, duplication of effort, inconsistency between donor approaches and confusion about roles and responsibilities. However, it is not all bad news. IfP research notes that the Country Strategy Paper for Haiti is the product of a joint programming exercise between the EC, France, Spain, Germany and Sweden.

The need to better coordinate security-building efforts is reflected in various international and EU declarations. But despite policy frameworks agreed at the EU level, the bilateral assistance strategies of Member States continue in some cases to be developed in national capitals with little joint planning involving other actors. This approach may limit the participation of in-country embassies and their ability to bring field perspectives to bear which tends to undermine the relevance of programmes.

Certainly there is little guidance for practitioners on how to design and implement coherent and integrated security-building activities across the pillars and institutions of both the EU and the security sector, a factor which probably contributes to coordination failures. However, in the DRC but also elsewhere, recipient governments appear to prefer bilateral engagements over multilateral ones. This enables them to maintain greater control over partnerships and avoid real or perceived conditionalities on aid or intrusions on sovereignty in relation to security and human rights. Donors' own competing priorities often contribute to these problems, interested as they often are not only in development and peacebuilding but also foreign policy, counter-terrorism and similar issues. The fact is that different EU Member States and institutions address security-related issues in conflict-affected countries from a variety of perspectives, often simultaneously, depending on which priority, policy or department is in play.[19]

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17 OECD-DAC (2005b). *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. Paris, France.
18 For example, see: L. Nathan (2007). *No ownership, no commitment: A guide to local ownership of Security Sector Reform* (2nd Edition). Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.
19 For example, see: S. Babaud and E. Kets (2008). Op. cit. p.8.

FAILURE TO MAINSTREAM IMPORTANT CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Gender

Gender issues have gained broad recognition in areas such as human rights, development cooperation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in recent years. The adoption of international declarations has established a global framework which promotes gender mainstreaming.[20] Mainstreaming gender into security-building strategies, programmes and project implementation implies two complementary approaches: considering the quality and accessibility of security provision for women, men, boys and girls; and promoting equal participation of men and women within security-building efforts.

There has been a growing effort to support gender-sensitive SSR practices within the EU and among other donors, primarily through policy development[21] and the elaboration of practical tools to guide and improve implementation.[22] However, IfP research shows that with the exception of Afghanistan, where there has been significant interaction and consultation between ministries and civil society on gender issues, gender-based needs are rarely assessed and addressed in a systematic way by programmes.

Justice

An observation common to many IfP case studies is that donor SSR programmes are far more likely to target sub-sectors such as policing and the military than the justice sector, most notably the corrections system. While targeting should be situation-specific, this is a *prima facie* gap because of the justice sector's importance in post-conflict situations where tackling impunity and restoring the rule of law are crucial elements in reducing the likelihood of further outbreaks of violence, and in reducing abuse of the population by security agents.

It is also important to note that in many conflict-affected societies where the domestic judicial and security system has essentially failed, additional safeguards and follow-up will be required to support SSR and justice programmes, particularly regarding the prosecution of the most serious human rights abusers. As noted in the DRC case study, these may include: witness protection; legal assistance; smart aid to enable women to participate in trials (such as the provision of childcare); court monitors to ensure international standards are being met; and follow-up to ensure that judgments (such as reparation payments, prison sentences) are carried out.

Justice-sensitive approaches to SSR

Transitional justice – which refers to a range of judicial and non-judicial approaches to address legacies of serious human rights abuse, provide recognition and reparation to survivors and contribute to social reconstruction – is even less recognised within current security-building frameworks. Justice-sensitive approaches to SSR – the reform of abusive institutions, particularly within the security system – are an important part of a transitional justice approach and are particularly necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding over the longer term.

This is particularly true of contexts such as the DRC where entrenched impunity for past and present grievous human rights abuses is a clear and present driver of fear, tension and conflict. "Vetting" is a part of a justice-sensitive approach to SSR, which as part of a broader SSR programme will help reform an abusive institution and transform its role in society. Such an approach requires an in-depth public consultation and planning process, which will consider the appropriate criteria for selection or exclusion of individuals from particular posts and which types of reform are feasible (including, for example, excluding some individuals from key institutions).

LIMITED ATTENTION TO POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE

It is important to note that the pursuit of these policy goals by international donors does not take place in a political vacuum. In many conflict-affected environments, outside attempts to change or influence the security sector are perceived as intruding on national sovereignty.[23] Security-building interventions, particularly SSR,

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20 Including, for example, the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000).

21 For example, see: Council of the EU (2006c). *Council Conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management*. 2760th General Affairs Council meeting. Brussels, Belgium.

22 Bastick, M. and Valasek, K. (Eds.) (2008). *Gender & Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW.

23 It is important to note, however, that governments cannot sacrifice the security of their citizens for state security following the recognition that states have a primary responsibility to protect their own populations – see Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2005.

can be highly sensitive in so far as they touch on issues of governance and human rights and challenge entrenched power structures.

IfP research shows that security-building efforts that succeed are typically grounded in effective national political processes (one element of which may be peace agreements), and generally backed up by robust diplomatic dialogues between donors and recipient states. Where conflicts have important regional aspects (e.g. Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC and Haiti) dialogue may need to be maintained on that track also to give security-building activities real purchase. Conversely, where security-building programmes fail, it is often because too much faith has been invested in technical/programmatic responses where the political conditions for progress at the operational level are absent.[24]

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24   For example, see: Lamb, G. with Ginnifer, J. (2008). *Current approaches to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme design and implementation*. Thematic Working Paper 1, Institute for Security Studies and University of Bradford. Available at http://www. ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/images/DDR%20Working%20Paper%201.pdf; Saferworld (2008). *Developing integrated approaches to post-conflict security and recovery: A case study of integrated DDR in Sudan*. Available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/ Sudan_DDR_A4.pdf.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous sections illustrate that translating policy commitments into effective security-building programming is not easy, particularly in complex conflict-affected environments. It is however clear that if these significant challenges can be overcome, the EU has the potential to implement effective security-building programmes that significantly contribute to peacebuilding. Through sustained political and diplomatic dialogue to foster political will, local leadership and international support, the EU can play a fundamental role in driving and sustaining programmes that facilitate accessible and accountable security provision and contribute to improving human security more broadly.

The recommendations below focus on specific practical steps that the EU could take to enhance the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of its security-building activities, particularly in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It is important to note that these recommendations require further development involving relevant stakeholders to produce practical and realistic measures which are tailored to the relevant institutions and agencies of the Council, the Commission and Member States. Phase II of the Initiative for Peacebuilding (commencing March 2009) potentially offers an opportunity for IfP security cluster members to facilitate and/ or participate in such work.

1. Council, Commission and Member State security practitioners should plan and develop security-building activities on the basis of a shared and solid evidence base, including conflict analyses.

Given the failings detailed above in relation to conflict and context analysis, accurate needs assessment and information sharing, improvements are obviously needed by way of better analytical tools and communication protocols, and awareness-raising around such mechanisms. Accordingly, the Commission, Member States and Council should ensure that the action and implementation plans for the Council Conclusions on security and development and on situations of fragility include recommendations on how to improve the understanding, scope and use of existing assessment and diagnostic tools and explore options for disseminating and using their findings.

A logical first step would be to map existing assessment tools and methodologies designed both for conflict analysis or security-building initiatives in order to identify overlaps and complementarities between them, perhaps leading to a common assessment protocol which integrates elements from the existing tools as necessary. This mapping exercise should not be limited to EU institutions and Member States but should include international organisations (e.g. OECD, UNDP, World Bank) and NGOs, many of which have sophisticated conflict analysis and assessment methodologies. [25] Developing the tools and arrangements required to conduct conflict/context assessments which produce practical, workable recommendations for building peace or reducing tension and conflict through security-building should be the immediate starting point.

Subsequent to this, consideration should be given to the most cost- and time-effective way of systematically sharing existing analysis among EU institutions and Member States to avoid duplication. Disseminating this information in a meaningful and usable way across the community to relevant policy-makers and practitioners could greatly aid efforts to plan and implement security-building activities from a consistent evidence base.

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25   For an overview of conflict analysis/conflict sensitivity tools, see: APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld (2004). *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding*. Available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/ publications.php/148/conflict_sensitive_approaches_to_development_humanitarian_assistance_and_peacebuilding; for basic SSR needs assessment tools, see: OECD-DAC (2007). Op. cit.; finally, a commonly accepted assessment framework for DDR is available within: UN (2006). *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*. Available at http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/.

2. The Council, Commission and Member States should ensure that when carried out in conflict-affected or fragile states, security-building activities are explicitly targeted at conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Despite the different entry points and approaches to security-building taken by EU institutions and Member States, it is vital that a conflict prevention/peacebuilding perspective informs their decision-making in conflict-affected environments. This will maximise the potential for security-building initiatives to contribute to peace and stability while avoiding worsening conflict tensions. Such an approach would entail:

▪ Using conflict/context analysis as the starting point for programme design and as an ongoing feature of project implementation;
▪ Adopting specific and explicit conflict prevention/peacebuilding objectives in programme documents and discourse;
▪ Designing programmes to address causes and drivers of conflict as well as enhancing security;
▪ Ensuring that the means by which programmes are delivered are consistent with the desired end and that those programmes pay due attention to core peacebuilding principles such as participation and inclusion;
▪ Ensuring the justice- and conflict-sensitivity of interventions by monitoring and managing progress carefully so as to limit harm and maximise the contribution to peace; and
▪ Evaluating programmes in relation to their positive or negative impact on conflict.

3. Council, Commission and Member State practitioners should adopt more participatory ways of delivering security-building programmes, in the first instance by adopting and promoting new tools for consulting communities on security issues and programme priorities.

Public participation in security-building programmes has, to date, been quite limited. The factors working against public involvement are several, but significant progress in this area is possible if adequate resources, training, tools and awareness-raising is provided to practitioners.

The Council, Commission and Member States should begin drawing on the work of others (including NGOs) to adopt more participatory ways of working. Introducing new tools that enable local people to identify and prioritise their own security needs as the basis for planning, implementing and evaluating security-building activities is a good starting point. Practitioners will need to be trained in these approaches, however, and more will need to be done to introduce specialists with the necessary "soft" skills into the pool of technically-oriented security practitioners that currently exists. The experience and lessons learned by NGOs and others such as UNDP could prove instructive in the development of such tools, guidance and training for EU actors.

4. The Council, Commission and Member States should enhance efforts to increase local ownership of security-building activities by supporting and encouraging the development of comprehensive national security/SSR strategies with broad ownership, together with capacity-building support for the administrative and operational structures necessary to deliver and oversee programmes and reforms.

To address recurrent problems of national ownership, the Council, Commission and Member States should routinely support and encourage the development of comprehensive national security/security-building strategies. These should be used as an overarching guide to programme direction and be developed through as consultative and participatory a process as possible, with particular emphasis on input from oversight structures and civil society. Moreover, they should reference and link with national development frameworks and conflict prevention/peacebuilding strategies where these exist.

Donors should also typically look to provide capacity-building support for the administrative and operational structures necessary to oversee and deliver nationally-owned security-building programmes and strategies. These structures may include inter-ministerial steering committees, implementation commissions and task teams, parliamentary committees, users' groups and external (e.g. civil society) oversight actors.

It should be noted, however, that in some cases the national/host government may not share the same vision for holistic and people-focused security-building as that which should be promoted by donors. In such cases, donors

should seek to promote such approaches and avoid supporting security programmes that entrench manipulative and elitist power structures at the expense of genuine participatory local ownership.

5. Council, Commission and Member State security practitioners should act at the national and local levels to identify and respond to specific gender, justice and transitional justice issues, making better use of any existing tools and guidance on these issues and supplementing this with community-wide awareness-raising and training drives.

As noted above, the EU and other donors now have policies, tools and guidelines in place that can be drawn on to help in the mainstreaming of gender into security-building activities such as SSR. Specific measures needed in this area include, *inter alia:*

- The provision of gender-awareness training for local implementers and translators;
- The development of gender-sensitive codes of conduct for security forces;
- Capacity-building of specialised units to equip police with the necessary skills to successfully investigate gender-based violence such as sexual crime;
- Better recognising the role women can play as positive agents of change;
- Developing an integrated gender strategy; and
- Ensuring there is sufficient gender expertise within EU programmes.

IfP research also provides concrete examples of how donors can mainstream transitional justice. These include, *inter alia*:

- Ensuring that transitional justice processes grow from the identification of local needs and public consultation;
- Ensuring a justice-sensitive approach to the demobilisation of combatants;
- Building in public accountability mechanisms to security and justice reforms;
- Examining options for vetting processes;
- Establishing merit-based appointments and adequate pay grades for judges, police and military on a case-by-case basis;
- Prioritising the establishment and capacity-building of courts for the prosecution of at least the more serious human rights abusers;
- Promoting the prosecution of perpetrators of human rights abuses and violent crime under domestic law;
- Building the capacity of the judicial system to resist political pressure and corruption; and
- Training and awareness-raising for EU personnel on transitional justice issues.

6. In order to ensure greater coherence and coordination between EU security-building strategies and activities, the Commission, Member States and successive EU Presidencies should prioritise the development and implementation of action plans for the Council Conclusions on security and development and situations of fragility which include guidance on the development of country strategies/visions as the basis for security-building efforts.

As previously noted, donor commitment to harmonising and coordinating security-building efforts is reflected in various international and EU declarations. Yet there is still little guidance for practitioners on how to design and implement coherent and integrated security-building strategies and activities across the pillars and institutions.

It is vital that the process to develop these action and implementation plans is prioritised and supported by current and future EU Presidencies. These initiatives have the potential to address some of the challenges of coordination and coherence among EU actors and beyond, and ultimately to increase the relevance, effectiveness and impact of international security-building efforts. For this to become a reality, the Commission, Member States and successive EU Presidencies will need to invest time, resources and demonstrate leadership in developing and applying the principles contained within the Council Conclusions.

At present, it appears that the development of the implementation plan for the Council Conclusions on situations of fragility is progressing and will be prioritised under the Swedish Presidency in the second half of 2009. The

Commission's approach to addressing fragility in a number of pilot countries should feed into the development of the implementation plan by producing lessons on how to make the principles of the Council Conclusions on situations of fragility operational. The development of the action plan for the Council Conclusions on security and development is also in progress. The Czech Presidency should prioritise the adoption of this action plan and ensure that it responds to the recommendations in the Council Conclusions.

The plans should draw from the case studies and pilot projects requested in the Council Conclusions and fully reflect recommendations to improve coherence and coordination of EU programming by *inter alia*:

- Increasing and improving capacities to conduct joint analysis and assessment;
- Enhancing information flows on policy developments and ongoing and planned security-building activities;
- Ensuring coordination with actors in the field including humanitarian and non-EU actors;
- Boosting in-house expertise, for example through training;
- Encouraging Country and Thematic Teams involving Commission, Council and Member States to work towards more coherent and coordinated action at country level; and
- Enhancing the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) strategic framework.

7. Council, Commission and Member States should, in addition to refining their approach to programmatic and operational questions, ensure that security-building programmes are supported by and linked to political dialogue with key national, regional and international decision-makers in each case.

IfP research emphasises that security-building efforts are often politically sensitive. Failure to nurture political dialogue to support programmes can have significant opportunity costs and seriously affect the overall impact of security-building activities. A structured and regular political dialogue can act as an effective early warning tool. It can also enable practitioners to take advantage of political momentum in-country and take steps to avoid (or at least identify) potential political manipulation of security and development assistance. It can be essential in applying pressure on recipient states and security institutions to recognise international principles such as human rights, due process, rule of law and freedom of speech.

It is therefore incumbent on the EU and Member States to invest time and resources in fostering and maintaining dialogue in support of security-building interventions. The specific content and process for political dialogue will vary in each case. Common desirable characteristics of any dialogue process would however include:

- High-level participation and representation from key national, regional and international stakeholders;
- A clear oversight and monitoring mandate in relation to national security-building programmes;
- Robust working procedures, including dispute-resolution arrangements;
- The forging of appropriate linkages between different high-level national strategies and policies on peacebuilding, development and security;
- Due attention to international laws and standards relevant to security-building, conflict prevention, development, and human rights; and
- Sufficient attention to external communication and transparency to maintain public confidence.

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